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I.  Introduction to the Hatch Waxman Act’s exemption from patent infringement 
and the concerns of research tool patent owners.
This paper focuses on the tension between the Hatch Waxman Act’s objectives 
and the concerns surrounding research tools—particularly in the biotech or 
pharmaceutical industry.  The Hatch Waxman Act is a statutory exemption from patent 
infringement claims enacted by Congress to permit a competing researcher to use a 
patented invention for the purpose of obtaining Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approval. The importance of properly applying the Hatch Waxman Act to research tools 
is heightened, because of the life saving potential of generic drugs and the vital role that 
research tools play in conducting pharmaceutical research.  In relevant part, the Hatch 
Waxman Act states: 
“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the 
United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a 
new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is 
primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma 
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation 
techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission 
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale 
of drugs or veterinary biological products.”  35 USC § 271 (e) (1).   
 
Generally, the objective of the Hatch Waxman Act was to stimulate the timely 
development of competing, alternative, or derivative products by permitting use of a 
patented invention during the term of a patentee’s right to exclude others from using it.  
Although the Hatch Waxman Act was initially designed to stimulate development of 
generic drugs, it has been interpreted by courts to have a much broader scope.  This broad 
interpretation has created concerns surrounding applying the Hatch Waxman Act to 
“research tools.” 
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“Research tools” are patented inventions that are used to study other materials or 
aid in performing experiments.1 “Research tools” are not the end product a researcher 
seeks to obtain, but a method of performing experiments or research more efficiently.2
In fact, “research tools” allow pharmaceutical research to progress more efficiently,
rapidly and with lower costs.3 The concerns about applying the Hatch Waxman Act to 
“research tools” are the following: 1) owners of research tools patents will lose revenues 
from an inability to enforce their patents and be unable to recoup their research and 
development costs;4 2) there will be a decrease in the development or production of new 
or improved versions of “research tools”;5 3) pharmaceutical research and development 
will be adversely affected by excluding “research tools” from the Hatch Waxman Act’s 
protection for researchers;6 4) researchers will be discouraged from undertaking 
development of alternative or improved versions of patented inventions due to the 
licensing revenues they would have to pay for use of “research tools”;7 and 5) the 
potential for a patentee to stifle competition by withholding access to a research tool to 
protect his market for his branded patented product.    
 Some of these concerns favor applying the Hatch Waxman Act or FDA 
exemption to research tools and others disfavor applying it to research tools.  In order to 
understand how these concerns surrounding a possible application of the FDA exemption 
to research tools arose, the article begins by exploring three distinct stages in the 
evolution of the Hatch Waxman Act’s exemption from patent infringement: 1) the 
genesis of 35 USC § 271 (e) (1) (the “FDA exemption”); 2) the expansion of the types of 
“patented inventions” covered by the FDA exemption; and 3) the expansion of the FDA 
exemption to cover all phases of research involved in obtaining the FDA’s approval.  
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Next, the article will summarize the current form of the analysis used to determine 
whether or not a potential infringer’s actions are protected from infringement by the FDA 
exemption.   
In the process, the article will identify the difficulty involved in permitting a 
potential infringer to use a “patented invention” as a “research tool” and assert the FDA 
exemption as a defense to infringement claims.  Lastly, the article proposes to protect the 
interests of “research tool” patent holders, without inhibiting the objective of the FDA 
exemption—permitting researchers to use a patented invention to obtain timely approval 
of competing or derivative products.  
II.  Three crucial stages in the evolution of the FDA exemption from patent 
infringement.
A. The Federal Circuit creates the need for the FDA exemption from patent 
infringement by its decision in Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals 
Inc.
In 1984, Congress enacted the FDA exemption in response to the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Inc.8 In that case, the 
Federal Circuit held that using a patented invention to perform testing designed to acquire 
pre-market regulatory approval from the FDA constitutes patent infringement.9 The 
Roche ruling prevented a researcher from using a “patented invention” to perform 
experiments designed to obtain FDA approval of a competing product.10 In Roche, Bolar 
had sought to begin using “flurzapem hydrochloride” to perform testing to produce a 
generic version of Roche’s branded sleeping pill called “dalmane.”11 Roche, the assignee 
of the ‘053 patent sued Bolar for infringement for using “dalmane.”12 Normally, 35 USC 
§ 271 (a) prevents others from using a patented product without a license from the 
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patentee.1 The district court found for Bolar, because its interpretation of “use” in § 271 
(a) did not include using a patented compound to perform tests designed to obtain FDA 
approval for a generic version of “dalmane.”13 The Federal Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s decision in Roche, and interpreted “use” under § 271 (a) to include any “use” of a 
patented compound, including using a patented compound to gather information for 
obtaining approval of a generic version of that compound.14 
1. The Federal Circuit opines that the common law research 
exemption never permitted commercial enterprises like using a 
patented invention to obtain FDA approval of a competing product.  
 
The Roche court explicitly held that Bolar may not use Roche’s patented drug 
before patent expiration and delayed the introduction of a competing generic drug to the 
market.  In making this ruling, the Federal Circuit created a distinction between the 
common law experimental use exemption, which had been applied by courts to certain 
non-commercial infringement, and Bolar’s argument for a public policy exception to 
infringement for the use of a patented drug to acquire information for FDA approval of a 
generic drug.15 
The common law experimental use exemption from patent infringement was 
created by Justice Story in Whittemore v. Cutter.16 The common law experimental use 
exemption permits research that is performed for philosophical purposes or to determine 
that a claimed invention actually works as described.17 However, the common law 
experimental use exemption only permits infringing uses, where there is no intent to 
profit from infringement of a patentee’s rights.18 Bolar conceded that the common law 
 
1 35 USC § 271 (a) outlines a patent owner’s right to exclude others and permits patentees to assert claims 
for infringement of these rights.  Specifically, § 271 (a) states, “Except as otherwise provided in this title, 
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, 
infringes the patent.” 
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experimental use exemption did not previously include a right to use a patented 
compound for the purpose of obtaining information for FDA approval of a generic drug.19 
Based on the commercial motives for developing generic drugs, the Federal Circuit went 
on to proclaim that Congress, rather than the courts, should decide whether or not using a 
patented compound to gather information for FDA approval of a generic drug should be 
exempt from patent infringement.20 
2. Congress responds to Roche by enacting the FDA exemption from 
patent infringement to enable another’s use of a patented invention to 
acquire FDA approval of a competing or generic product. 
Congress enacted the FDA exemption to ensure that a patent holder’s right to 
exclude would not be extended by regulatory delays a competitor faced in the FDA’s 
approval process.21 Around the time Roche was decided, the FDA approval process was 
about seven to ten years long.22 Without the FDA exemption, a competitor would face a 
seven to ten year delay in bringing a competing product to the market, in effect granting 
the patentee a seven to ten year extension on his patent rights.  After the Roche decision, 
Congress enacted two provisions: an extension of the patent term (35 USC §156 (f)) to 
offset the delays a pioneer drug manufacturer encountered; and an exemption from 
infringement (35 USC § 271 (e) (1)) for a generic drug manufacturer seeking to obtain 
FDA approval for the post expiration sale of generic versions of a patented drug.23 
Courts have struggled with determining the proper scope of the FDA exemption 
(35 USC § 271 (e) (1)).  In particular, the issues have surrounded interpretation of the 
quoted terms: 1) “patented invention”; and 2) solely for uses “reasonably related” to the 
development and submission of information under a “Federal law” which regulates the 
manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.  However, as 
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indicated by court opinions below, courts have consistently interpreted the quoted terms 
broadly in an effort to accomplish the objectives of the FDA exemption.  This continued 
trend raises legitimate concerns about research tools being ensnared in the broad net of 
protected activity provided by the FDA exemption. 
B.  The Supreme Court interprets “patented invention” and “federal law” 
broadly to include medical devices and expands the reach of the FDA 
exemption from patent infringement.   
 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., the Supreme Court was faced with deciding 
whether or not using a Class III medical device was protected by the FDA exemption.24 
In deciding that the latter includes class III medical devices, the Court discussed the 
duality between the 35 USC §156 (f)2 extension of a patent term and the 35 USC § 271 
(e) (1) exemption from patent infringement.25 Congress simultaneously enacted §156 and 
§ 271 (e) (1) to remedy two distortions.26 
Congress enacted § 156 to remedy the disincentive caused by regulatory delays 
pioneering inventors encountered in attempting to commercialize their inventions.27 
Pioneering inventors were limited by the seventeen year (now twenty year) term for their 
patents, but would be unable to commercially exploit their inventions until they met the 
FDA’s regulatory requirements.28 Congress enacted § 156, granting a pioneering 
inventor up to a five year extension on the life of his patent.29 This additional five year 
term is permitted to allow the pioneering inventor to recoup some of the commercial 
profit of his invention that he was not able to acquire, because of a regulatory delay in 
bringing a commercial embodiment of his invention to the market.30 However, the Lilly 
court only discussed § 156 to clarify the breadth of § 271 (e) (1) or the FDA exemption. 31 
2 In  Lilly, the Supreme Court refers to 35 USC § 156 as section 201 of The Drug Competition Act and 
Patent Term Restoration act of 1984 and 35 USC § 271 (e) (1) is referred to as section 202 of the Drug 
Competition Act and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.  
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1. Congress’ desire to eliminate the regulatory delay a competitor 
faced in bringing a competing or generic FDA approved product to 
the market.  
Congress enacted § 271 (e) (1) to permit a competitor to make an otherwise 
infringing use of a patented invention during the term of the patent holder’s right to 
exclude for the purpose of acquiring FDA approval.32 Based upon Congress’ specific 
awareness of the two problems created by the FDA’s regulatory scheme, the 
simultaneous enactment of sections 156 and 271 (e) (1), and the fact that Class III 
medical devices were granted an extension under § 156, the Supreme Court interpreted a 
“patented invention” under § 271 (e) (1) to include medical devices (Class III only), food 
and color additives, new and antibiotic drugs, and human biological products.33 
The Supreme Court opined that it would be illogical for Congress to recognize the 
regulatory delay for a pioneering inventor of a Class III medical device, but ignore the 
regulatory delay a follow up inventor faced in developing alternative, competing, or 
generic versions of the pioneering Class III medical device.34 The Supreme Court held 
that that promoting the development of generic drugs might have been the initial impetus 
for the FDA exemption, but use of the terms “Federal law” included class III medical 
devices under the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).35 After Lilly, the FDA 
exemption applies to the use of patented medical devices (Class III), food and color 
additives, new and antibiotic drugs, and human biological products for the purpose of 
acquiring FDA approval. 36 
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C.  The Federal Circuit interprets “reasonably related” narrowly to protect 
the interests of research tool patent holders by excluding some phases of 
research from the FDA exemption’s protection against patent infringement 
claims. 
 
The next major step in the evolution of the FDA exemption was the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Merck I. 3 In Merck I, the Federal Circuit made an effort to exclude 
the upstream phase of research from the protection of the FDA exemption.  "Upstream" 
and "downstream" respectively refer to earlier and later parts of the research and 
development process, or "stream" of research. 37 The results of an experiment performed 
early on, or upstream, may be needed in order to make informed decisions about what 
experiments to perform later, or downstream. 38 In pharmaceutical research, for example, 
the large scale initial screening of possible drug candidates in the laboratory would be 
upstream of later, downstream, pre-clinical4 and clinical trials. 39 The upstream research 
results are not submitted to the FDA, but identify subject matter for subsequent or 
downstream research.40 
The Federal Circuit recognized that research tools are frequently used during the 
upstream phase of research to filter and identify the best drug candidates.41 The Federal 
Circuit was concerned that permitting the FDA exemption to cover research activities in 
this upstream phase as opposed to the downstream (pre-clinical or clinical activities) 
phase of research would remove an entire category of research tool patents from patent 
protection. 42 Implicitly, the Federal Circuit was attempting to strike a proper balance 
 
3 Merck I is a reference to the Federal Circuit opinion--Integra Life Sciences I Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 
F.3d 860, 865-6, (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Merck II is a reference to the Supreme Court opinion--Merck KGaA v. 
Integra Lice Sciences I Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2372, 2380-1, (2005).  
4 Pre-clinical generally refers to the in vitro, modeling and animal studies that the FDA requires to identify 
potential risk factors before clinical testing on humans can begin.  The preclinical studies are often 
performed to justify undertaking clinical studies.  In pharmaceutical research, pre-clinical studies typically 
involve the pharmacological and toxicological effects of a drug candidate.  See. Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae at 10, 14, Merck v. Integra, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237).   
and http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/clinxeno.pdf 
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between the objectives of the FDA exemption and protecting research tool patent owners’ 
incentive to produce more research tools.43 
In Merck I, Dr. Cheresh and Scripps had identified an RGD peptide (tri peptide 
segment of fibronectin) that was capable of promoting cell adhesion to substrates in 
culture and in vivo.44 The RGD peptide interacts with alpha and beta receptors on the 
integrin proteins found on cell surfaces.45 Dr. Cheresh discovered that the RGD peptide 
could be used to prevent the formation of new blood vessels (angiogenesis) by blocking 
the alpha and beta receptors on the integrins.46 Inhibiting angiogenesis could be used to 
halt tumor cell growth and anti-angiogenic therapies could be used to help treat diabetic 
retinopathy, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, and inflammatory bowel disease.47 
Merck recognized the potential impact of Dr. Cheresh’s discovery and hired 
Cheresh and Scripps to identify potential drug candidates that might inhibit 
angiogenesis.48 Merck then entered into an agreement to fund research necessary to 
obtain FDA approval.49 The agreement contemplated performing clinical trials, within 
three years.50 There were tests performed relating to specificity, efficacy, and toxicity for 
EMD 66203, 85189, and 121974.51 In 1997, EMD 121974 was determined to be the best 
candidate for clinical development.52 Integra found out about the Scripps Merck 
agreement and initiated licensing negotiations.53 The licensing negotiations broke down 
and Integra sued Cheresh, Scripps and Merck for patent infringement.54 The claims 
against Scripps and Cheresh were dismissed by the district court.55 Merck asserted that 
its activities were protected by the FDA exemption.56 Merck lost at the district court 
level and appealed to the Federal Circuit.57 
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1. The Federal Circuit incorrectly states that upstream and preclinical 
activities are too remote from FDA approval to be protected under 
the Hatch Waxman Act’s defense from patent infringement. 
 
In Merck I, the Federal Circuit stated that the FDA exemption did not reach all 
forms of exploratory research designed to identify new drug candidates.58 The Merck I, 
court framed the issue as whether or not the FDA exemption encompassed pre-clinical 
research to identify the best potential drug candidate to subject to the FDA approval 
process.59 The Federal Circuit stated that research that does not directly contribute to the 
generation of information for FDA approval already strains the reasonable relationship 
contemplated by the FDA exemption and that research to identify the best potential drug 
candidate is not “reasonably related” to development and submission of information to 
the FDA.60 
The Federal Circuit opined that the FDA exemption does not encompass activities 
that extend far beyond the effort to gather information for FDA approval of a patented 
pioneer drug already on the market.61 For example, the FDA exemption does not 
encompass all stages for the development of new drugs, because those new drugs will 
also need FDA approval.62 The FDA exemption does not encompass all experimental 
activity that may in the distant future lead to an FDA approval process, and it does not 
cover exploratory research that forms only a predicate for remote future clinical tests.63 
The Federal Circuit was concerned that permitting the FDA exemption to apply in both 
upstream and downstream research activities would strip owners’ of research tool patents 
of the ability to derive a commercial benefit from their inventions.64 
Although neither party argued that the RGD peptide was a research tool, the 
Federal Circuit noted that the RGD peptide could be used as a tool in a laboratory to help 
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discover new drugs or treatments.65 The Federal Circuit recognized that some 
biotechnology patents are tools that help facilitate upstream research to identify new or 
candidate drugs and also help conduct downstream experiments for FDA approval.66 The 
Federal Circuit was concerned that since downstream clinical trials were covered by the 
FDA exemption the only source of licensing revenues for holders of some biotech 
research tool patents was licensing during the general or upstream research phase.67 The 
Federal Circuit attempted to protect these interests by distinguishing between general 
exploratory research and clinical research.68 However, on appeal the Supreme Court 
disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s narrow reading of “reasonably related.”    
D.  The Supreme Court rejects the Federal Circuit’s effort to exclude 
upstream and pre-clinical research activities from the definition of 
“reasonably related.”   
 
In Merck II, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, opining 
that the FDA exemption was broader than suggested by the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation.  The Supreme Court stated that the FDA exemption “extends to all uses of 
patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any 
information under the FDCA.”69 In the Supreme Court’s opinion upstream activities 
could be reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval.70 
1. The Supreme Court states that the FDA exemption does not exclude 
activities based on the phase of research. 
The Merck II Court clarified that the FDA exemption does not exclude activities 
based on whether they take place in the pre-clinical or clinical phase of research.71 The 
FDA approval process often requires both pre-clinical and clinical research work; thus 
the phase of research is not a ground for prohibiting a party from asserting the FDA 
exemption.72 The Supreme Court recognized that pre-clinical steps are required before a 
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researcher can reach the clinical testing phase in the FDA approval process.73 A
necessary pre-cursor to the FDA’s approval process is identifying a drug candidate to be 
subsequently subjected to clinical tests.74 If a researcher has not identified a drug 
candidate to subject to the FDA’s clinical tests, then no clinical tests can be performed.75 
Further, the Supreme Court asserted that the research and FDA approval 
processes involve trial and error; often a researcher does not know how much information 
will be enough to obtain approval or what type of information it will end up submitting to 
obtain FDA approval.76 The Court reiterated that a researcher’s failure to submit results 
of his activities to the FDA for approval does not remove his activities from the 
protection of the FDA exemption.77 Although the Supreme Court agreed that basic 
exploratory research was not covered by the FDA exemption, it held that research done to 
identify a particular drug candidate or pre-clinical work done for obtaining FDA approval 
may be covered by the FDA exemption.78 
In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the key to “determining if a use is reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information…under Federal law” is 
whether or not a researcher “has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented 
compound may work, through a particular biological process to produce a particular 
physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be 
appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA.”79 The Court considered Merck’s 
actions in light of FDA regulations relating to pre-clinical studies, clinical studies, good 
laboratory practice requirements, permissive variances from the good laboratory practice 
requirements, industry practices, and Merck’s knowledge of the compound being tested 
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and its effects to find that it was reasonable for Merck to believe such activities were 
necessary to obtain FDA approval.80 
2.  However, the Supreme Court did not address the possibility of 
applying the FDA exemption to research tools.  
Since neither party had argued that the RGD peptide was a research tool, the 
Court would not consider whether or not a narrower construction of the FDA exemption 
should apply to research tool patents.81 The Supreme Court clarified that the RGD 
peptide sequence was not a research tool, but the compound being tested.82 In dictum, 
the Court alluded to Judge Newman’s dissenting remarks as a potential means for 
deciding whether or not something is being used as a research tool. 83 Asking whether or 
not a patented invention was the object being tested or just an aid for carrying out 
experiments to develop information for the FDA’s regulatory process could be a method 
for distinguishing between research tools and other patented inventions.84 
Now that we have considered and reviewed the evolution of the FDA exemption, 
we can consider the current interpretation and the tension in applying the FDA exemption 
to research tools.  Although a few courts have interpreted the FDA exemption narrowly, 
most courts have continued to interpret the FDA exemption broadly to permit a variety of 
activities by researchers.  The expanding reach of the FDA exemption to protect uses of a 
variety of inventions, during almost any phase of research for almost any activities that 
could conceivably lead to FDA approval may remove all patent protection for some 
research tools.85 
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III. Summary of the current interpretation of the FDA exemption.
At this point summarizing the current interpretation of “patented invention”; and 
solely for uses “reasonably related” to the development and submission of information 
under a “Federal law” which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products will help clarify the breadth of the FDA exemption’s ability protect 
researchers from infringement claims.   
A. Court opinions have marginalized the intent requirement by permitting 
competing researchers to have additional commercial motives.  
 
The Supreme Court has stated that there is a requirement that a researcher’s 
activities are performed for the purpose or with the intent to acquire information 
reasonably believed to be necessary to obtain FDA approval.86 Further, a researcher must 
intend its activities to yield a particular drug or reasonably believe that the compound will 
cause the sorts of physiological effects it intends to induce.87 The research activities 
should be intended to generate information for FDA approval.88 However, many court 
decisions use language which seems to state that the intent or purpose of the researcher is 
irrelevant to determining whether or not the FDA exemption applies. 89 In performing a 
more scrutinizing review, what these courts hold is that if the intent to obtain FDA 
approval is established, then additional motives may not necessarily defeat the 
exemption.90 
If a researcher meets the threshold intent requirement, then it may have other 
commercial purposes without losing the protection of the FDA exemption.91 Some 
federal court decisions have held that massive preparation for post-expiration sales, 
including the subsequent use of test results for fundraising, marketing, and obtaining 
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foreign regulatory agency approval; stockpiling of generic products; and sale of samples 
for use in clinical trials or use by FDA clinical investigators is permitted.92 
As long as the experiments are initially conducted with the intent to obtain FDA 
approval, other commercial motives to bring a competing or derivative product to market 
upon expiration of the patent may not defeat the FDA exemption.93 Testing in foreign 
countries to gather information for the FDA approval process is also permitted.94 On the 
other hand, making a patented invention and shipping it off to foreign regulatory agencies 
or use of a patented invention solely to obtain foreign regulatory approval may not be 
covered under the FDA exemption.95 The key is whether or not the circumstances 
demonstrate intent to use the patented invention to obtain FDA approval. 96  If the intent 
to obtain FDA approval is demonstrated, then additional motives or plans for using the 
test results will not prevent a party from successfully asserting the FDA exemption.97 
B.  Phases of research have absolutely no impact on the application of the 
FDA exemption.  
 
The phase of research—upstream, downstream, pre-clinical or clinical--really 
makes no difference in determining whether or not a researcher will be able to assert the 
FDA exemption.98 However, basic research activities without either the intent to acquire 
a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound will cause the physiological 
effects a researcher desires are not covered by the FDA exemption.99 Further, there must 
be a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments will produce the type of 
information that is relevant to obtaining FDA approval.100 
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C. “Reasonably related” is interpreted very broadly to permit a variety of 
activities that may lead to FDA approval.  
 
Courts permit a wide scope for trial and error to researchers’ decisions about the 
types of experiments or activities that may be performed to acquire FDA approval.101 A
researcher’s activities do not have to yield results that are ultimately submitted for 
approval; however, there must be a reasonable belief that its activities will generate the 
type of information necessary to obtain FDA approval.102 For the most part, courts will 
rely on the applicable Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) sections, FDA guidance--in 
the form of opinions and regulations, as well as industry practices in deciding what types 
of testing activities are relevant to obtaining approval.103 In fact, if there is an acceptable 
explanation for a variance from the FDA’s good laboratory practice standards, then 
“reasonably related” may be broad enough to excuse such variances.104 “Reasonably 
related” has been interpreted very broadly to cover almost anything that could 
conceivably be relevant to obtaining FDA approval. 
D. “Patented invention” is interpreted broadly by courts to cover a variety of 
products for which the FDCA requires approval.  
 
The FDA exemption’s definition of “patented invention” has been interpreted 
broadly to include any type of chemical or device for which FDA approval is required. 105 
Under the broader reading of Lilly, patented inventions include medical devices, food and 
color additives, new and antibiotic drugs, and human biological products.106 Since 
research tools are not necessarily a separate and distinct category of inventions they may 
fall into one of the preceding categories.  Many items may have dual uses as research 
tools and as commercial products or processes; therefore they do not fit neatly into any 
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single category.  However, whether or not the FDA exemption protects the use of 
patented research tools is still unclear.107 
More clearly stated: the unanswered question is whether or not the FDA 
exemption was meant to permit the creation of competing or derivative products of 
patented inventions requiring FDA approval by using other patented research tools?   
With this understanding of the very wide breadth of the FDA exemption we are ready to 
consider the pharmaceutical and research tools industries’ concerns relating to patented 
research tools.   
IV. The pharmaceutical and research tools industries and the concern about
applying the FDA exemption to the use of research tools.
In 1999, Americans spent $125 billion dollars on pharmaceutical drugs.108 The 
pharmaceutical industry is a very large sector of the United States economy and research 
tools may be vital to the development of new drugs.  In 2002, the average cost to develop 
a new drug was 800 million dollars and the process to bring the drug to market was about 
ten to fifteen years long.109 In 2003, the biotech research tool industry had 200 million 
dollars in revenues and was expected to grow twenty percent a year.110 These numbers 
indicate that the pharmaceutical industry is a large part of the United States economy.  In 
addition, the growing biotech research tool industry is vital, because it helps to develop 
new methods of performing pharmaceutical research more efficiently, cheaply and at an 
accelerated rate.111 Therefore, meeting the concerns of research tool owners and properly 
balancing the interests of researchers developing new or competing drugs is necessary to 
ensure the continued prosperity of both industries.  A hypothetical example may illustrate 
the nature of the concerns surrounding the application of the FDA exemption to research 
tool patents.   
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A.  Hypothetical use of research tools and the problems with applying the 
current version of the FDA exemption to the use of research tools.  
 
As used in this article, the term research tool means one patented invention that is 
used to study or experiment with other materials, patented inventions or products.  With 
that understanding, consider a researcher making a generic version of a drug that is 
known to prohibit angiogenesis in cancerous cells.  In order to develop and test the 
generic (G1), a researcher wants to use the following patented inventions: 1) a chemical 
compound x that identifies cancerous cells; 2) a pipette that can be used to deliver G1 to 
the isolated cells; 3) a reagent z that is used to activate G1’s reaction with the cancerous 
cells; and 4) the branded drug (B1) that is known to prohibit angiogenesis in cancerous 
cells to use for determining bioequivalence with G1.  Should the researcher be able to use 
B1, compound x, the pipette and reagent z without purchasing them or licensing their 
use?  In other words, should the FDA exemption permit the researcher to use all four of 
these “patented inventions” to obtain FDA approval of G1? 
For purposes of this example, let us assume that in the above hypothetical, the 
researcher intends to use the results to obtain FDA approval for G1.  Further, let us 
assume that the researcher’s activities are reasonably related to acquiring FDA approval.  
The researcher has a reasonable belief that its activities are likely to generate the type of 
information necessary for acquiring FDA approval.  Under these circumstances, it is clear 
that use of B1 is currently protected from infringement claims by the FDA exemption.  
Should the FDA exemption also permit our hypothetical researcher’s use of compound x, 
the pipette, and reagent z?   
Presently, most courts have not opined on the use of a “patented invention” as a 
tool for performing experiments or studying other material.112 In the above hypothetical, 
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compound x, the pipette and reagent z are being used as tools to assist in performing 
experiments with other material, patented inventions or products to develop a generic 
drug (G1).  As argued more fully below, the aforementioned use of compound x, the 
pipette, and reagent z was not contemplated by Congress.113 The FDA exemption was 
enacted to ensure that our hypothetical researcher could use the branded drug (B1) during 
the life of its patent for acts designed to acquire FDA approval of a competing product.114 
B.  Permitting our hypothetical researcher to use reagent z and the method of 
producing reagent z will decrease revenues for the patentee.  
 
If researchers are permitted to use the FDA exemption as essentially a free license 
to use research tools in experiments to obtain FDA approval of a generic drug, then they 
will not need to purchase or license them from their owners.  Our hypothetical researcher 
could manufacturer some of these research tools on his own and use them with complete 
disregard for the rights of their owners.  Now, it may be that our researcher does not 
manufacture compound x and pipettes on his own, because of the costs involved in the 
manufacturing process or simply a lack of expertise.   However, this researcher should be 
able to manufacture reagent z and other tools similar to reagent z.   
Our hypothetical researcher’s ability to easily manufacture research tools like 
reagent z can be readily illustrated, if we assume that our reagent z is an enzyme that 
catalyzes the reaction between G1 and cancerous cells.  Assume the following: 1) the 
genetic code for making this reagent z has been isolated; 2) a cloning vector has been 
created and described; 3) the genetic code for reagent z has been linked to an indigenous 
gene to ensure that the genetic code for reagent z will be expressed in the transformed 
bacteria; and 4) working samples of transformed bacteria capable of producing reagent z 
have been deposited in an appropriate international depository.115 All our researcher has 
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to do is acquire a working sample and use it to generate its own miniature bio-chemical 
factory for producing reagent z.  Further, the patentee’s disclosure of his method of 
producing reagent z should enable most pharmaceutical researchers to manufacture these 
transformed bacteria en mass to produce reagent z with minimal additional costs.  
Consequently, a pharmaceutical researcher could very easily and cheaply create his own 
transformed bacteria that produce reagent z.   
If the FDA exemption protects such use, then our researcher will not need to 
license the method of creating reagent z from its owner.  The above hypothetical is 
limited to our researcher’s use of research tools in trying to develop a competing generic 
drug.  However, the same analysis and concerns may apply to use of research tools in 
developing competing medical devices, food color additives, and human biological 
products.  In effect, items like centrifuges, pipettes, cell lines, special assays for screening 
compounds, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal growth factors, combinatorial 
chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, 
laboratory equipment and machines--essentially anything that can or in the future may be 
used to study or identify other substances--would be available for a researcher to use 
without paying licensing fees.116 
A researcher may not elect to manufacture all of the abovementioned types of 
tools on his own, but a researcher is likely to manufacture some of these items (similar to 
reagent z) on his own to decrease his costs of research and development or threaten to 
manufacture them to negotiate for a lower licensing fee.  By applying the FDA 
exemption to research tool patents we have created a means for researchers to be able to 
limit the revenues patentees can obtain from licensing or sale of research tools.  If the 
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ability to enforce infringement of research tool patents is diminished by the FDA 
exemption, then the loss of revenues will decrease their value and inhibit their owners’ 
ability to recoup costs and invest in developing additional “research tools.”117 
Under the current interpretation of the FDA exemption, a researcher may be 
exempt from infringement liability for use of a “research tool” throughout the entire 
research stream, except for the basic or exploratory stage.118 To permit the FDA 
exemption to cover all uses of research tools would drastically decrease markets for 
research tools and incentives to produce the next generation of research tools.119 In order 
to ensure that there is an incentive to produce improved versions of reagent z or more 
efficient alternatives to this type of research tool, the FDA exemption should not protect 
all uses of such research tools to experiment with other patented inventions.  The need to 
protect the incentive to produce pioneering research tools can be better understood by 
considering the fundamental policies behind granting patents to inventors.  
C.  Two fundamental policies that drive our patent system and the 
disincentive effect created from applying the FDA exemption to all uses of 
patented research tools.   
 
The aforementioned loss of revenue creates a disincentive to others contemplating 
creating an alternative, competing, derivative, improved, or new version of reagent z.  
Patentees will not be able to enforce rights to the technology that they invent and may not 
be able to recoup the costs of commercialization, development and research.120 
Alternatively, individuals that develop such technology may choose to maintain the 
technology as a trade secret to protect their investment in developing it.121 Either way, 
there will be a disincentive to develop and disclose new research tools to the public.   
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The incentive to invent theory protects an inventor’s ability to obtain profits or 
revenues from his invention, because of the belief that a patent must be granted to an 
inventor as a reward for the efforts the inventor exerts in creating his claimed 
invention.122 In order for the inventor to undertake the research and developments costs 
involved in creating his invention, the inventor must be provided some assurance that he 
will be able to reap the commercial benefits of his invention.123 If the inventor cannot 
exclude others from practicing his claimed invention, then individuals that did not incur 
the research and development costs will be able to undercut the inventor’s efforts to reap 
the commercial rewards of his invention.124 
1.   Protecting the incentive for our hypothetical inventor (RVTR) to 
develop and disclose new research tools and methods of producing 
them.   
For example, let’s assume RVTR Inc. (RVTR) discovers reagent z5 and invents 
the aforementioned method of producing reagent z using transformed bacteria.  RVTR’s 
disclosure contributes and claims a previously undiscovered compound (reagent z) and 
the method of producing reagent z.  However, a hypothetical researcher comes along, 
reviews RVTR’s disclosure, and develops copies of the same transformed bacteria; or 
obtains a working sample of RVTR’s transformed bacteria for producing the same 
reagent z.  Next, this researcher proceeds to use RVTR’s claimed method and reagent z to 
conduct a variety of activities for FDA approval.  If RVTR cannot sue this researcher for 
infringing his patent on reagent z and method of producing reagent z, then the researcher 
 
5 Assume that RVTR’s method produces a highly concentrated solution of reagent z--it catalyzes reactions 
between G1 and cancer cells more efficiently and rapidly than any other solutions of reagent z found in 
nature.  In essence, this concentrated solution of reagent z cannot be found in nature, it was invented by 
RVTR’s process of using the transformed bacteria to create reagent z.  Consequently, there are no questions 
about patentability or validity of RVTR’s claims to this concentrated solution of reagent z or the method of 
producing it.  Use of the terms “reagent z” throughout the remainder of this paper refers to this highly 
concentrated solution of reagent z.  
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is able to use RVTR’s patent disclosure to avoid the research and development costs 
RVTR incurred.  By avoiding the research and development costs this hypothetical 
researcher is able to catch a free ride on RVTR’s efforts and create his own supply of 
reagent z.   
As a result, RVTR would lose the sales or licensing revenues it could have 
obtained from our hypothetical researcher or have to supply reagent z at a lower price to 
entice this researcher to buy reagent z, instead of making reagent z.  If multiple 
researchers or consumers of reagent z can force RVTR to supply reagent z at a lower 
price, then RVTR would not be able to reap all the commercial benefits of his invention. 6 
In effect, RVTR may be unable to recoup the costs of its research and development.  Its 
consumers (researchers) will be able to create their own supplies of reagent z for use in 
their experiments or compel a reduced price for RVTR’s reagent z.   In this context, 
applying the FDA exemption to all uses of reagent z will discourage RVTR from 
undertaking the effort involved in creating transformed bacteria capable of producing 
reagent z.  Therefore, the public would lose out on a pioneering inventor (RVTR) and 
associated follow up inventors that may develop a competing method of producing 
reagent z in greater quantity at half the costs.     
Because of the aforementioned scenario, sometimes RVTR will not undertake the 
effort to develop transformed bacteria capable of producing reagent z.  Other times, 
RVTR will undertake the effort to develop transformed bacteria capable of producing 
reagent z, but protect its invention as a trade secret.125 In this latter scenario, the 
incentive to disclose theory provides a greater justification for granting a patent to RVTR.  
 
6 Although the incentive to invest and disclose theories are traditionally used to justify the granting of 
patent protection in the first instance, they also provide justification for ensuring that the FDA exemption is 
not used too broadly to remove patent protection for research tools. 
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The incentive to disclose theory is premised on the belief that in order for an inventor to 
share his invention with the world he must be provided a patent right.126 As long as the 
invention cannot be reverse engineered, the inventor can continue to commercially 
exploit his invention and maintain it as a trade secret.127 
In our hypothetical, RVTR can sell reagent z and still maintain the method of 
producing it using transformed bacteria as a secret.  Since sale of reagent z does not 
enable others to reverse engineer RVTR’s method of producing reagent z, RVTR needs 
an incentive to disclose this method to the public.  If RVTR is granted a right to exclude 
others from using the transformed bacteria to produce reagent z, then it will be less 
motivated to keep it a secret.  Granting RVTR a patent permits it to commercially exploit 
the method of using transformed bacteria to produce reagent z in return for developing 
and disclosing the method to the public.128 
2.  Protecting the incentive to produce research tools is particularly 
important to the pharmaceutical industry, because it uses them to 
conduct research.  
 
“Research tools” play a vital in the pharmaceutical industry by allowing cheaper, 
more efficient and accelerated research. 129 Within the pharmaceutical industry, patented 
research tools often facilitate general research to identify candidate drugs as well as 
downstream safety-related experiments on those new drugs.130 These research tools are 
often used to aid in performing tests and basic research on thousands of compounds in the 
drug discovery process.131 In the short run, allowing use of research tools may have 
some initial stimulus for the development of competing or derivative pharmaceutical 
goods; however, in the long run the disincentive to produce a new generation of 
pioneering research tools will hurt the industry.132 
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Because most innovation builds upon prior invention, without these pioneering 
research tools, there will also be a decrease in the development of follow up research 
tools. 133 An overly broad exemption from patent infringement can cause more harm for 
the pharmaceutical industry, because it may lead to a decrease in the development of 
research tools it needs to efficiently develop pharmaceutical products.134 Now, that we 
recognize the need to protect the incentive to discover and disclose research tools, 
including methods of making research tools (like reagent z), we are ready to consider 
Congress’ objective in enacting the FDA exemption. 
D.  Congress enacted the FDA exemption to stimulate the development and 
sale of FDA approved products that compete with patented inventions that 
are the subject of a researcher’s FDA related experiments. 
 
The legislative history behind § 271 (e) (1)7 indicates that Congress intended to 
permit others to use the patented product to perform experiments for obtaining FDA 
approval of competing or derivative goods, so that they could be brought to the market 
without encountering a regulatory delay.135 In P.L. 98-417 entitled “Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act”, Congress specifically states that it was 
concerned about the anti-competitive effects of the FDA’s post-1962 drug approval 
process. 136 Congress further expressed dissatisfaction over a practical extension of the 
patented drug owner’s right to exclude competing generic drugs.137 
In fact, Congress explicitly stated that § 271 (e) (1) was enacted to permit 
competing generic manufactures to obtain a supply of a patented drug product to perform 
equivalency tests during the term of a patent holder’s right to exclude.138 Congress was 
attempting to avoid a practical extension of a patentee’s right to exclude, because of the 
regulatory delays a researcher encountered in bringing an alternative, competing or 
 
7 Within the legislative history Congress refers to § 271 (e) (1) as section 202.  
All copyrights retained by Vihar R. Patel 31
derivative version of a patentee’s invention.139 The FDA exemption was never intended 
to be a complete license to use any patented invention that may be useful in performing 
experiments on other patented inventions.140 
Interpreting the FDA exemption to permit only a competing researcher to use a 
patentee’s invention preserves Congress’ desire to prevent unwarranted extensions of a 
patentee’s rights.  Hypothetically assume that patented invention (P1) is subject to FDA 
approval requirements.  Now, hypothetically assume that P2 is not subject to FDA’s 
approval requirements.  In this part of the discussion, P1 refers to a branded patented 
invention that is subject to FDA approval.  P1 is the invention for which a researcher is 
seeking to develop an alternative, competing, derivative, generic or improved product.  
P2 refers to another patented invention that a researcher wants to use as a research tool—
to study or aid in performing experiments for developing an alternative, competing, 
derivative, generic or improved version of P1. 
In this scenario, the justification behind the FDA exemption cannot support use of 
P2 as a research tool to study or aid in performing research for the development of an 
alternative or competing version of P2 or P1.141 Since creating an alternative, competing, 
derivative or improved version of P2 is not subject to FDA regulations, it would not be 
subject to a regulatory delay.  Therefore, the P2 owner would not be able to obtain an 
undesirable extension of his patent rights.  If P2 is not subject to FDA approval, then the 
justification behind the FDA exemption that was described in the legislative history for § 
271 (e) (1) and discussed in Lilly cannot be used to apply the FDA exemption to P2.   
As explained in Lilly, Congress enacted the FDA exemption to offset a regulatory 
delay by permitting a competing researcher to use P1 during the term of the patent on 
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P1.142 The FDA exemption’s objective was to permit a competing researcher to use P1, 
which is subject to FDA regulations; because otherwise the P1 owner would acquire an 
unwarranted extension of his patent rights.143 Congress was specifically concerned with 
encouraging the development of products that compete with P1—it never intended to 
permit use of any patented invention (P2) to study or aid in performing experiments on 
P1.144 
Now, hypothetically assume that P2 is subject to FDA approval.  Even if, P2 is 
subject to FDA approval Congress could not have intended for the FDA exemption to 
permit use of P2 to study or aid in performing research to develop an alternative or 
competing version of P1.  Congress enacted the FDA exemption in direct response to the 
Roche opinion, the legislative history for § 271 (e) (1) and the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Lilly all indicate that the justification behind it was to offset a regulatory delay a 
competing researcher would face in bringing an alternative, competing, derivative or 
improved version of P1 to the market.145 The concern was that without the FDA 
exemption--the P1 owner would be able to prevent a competing researcher from using P1 
and acquire an unwarranted extension of his patent right, because of this regulatory 
delay.146 Since, a researcher using P2 to aid in the development of an alternative, 
competing, derivative or new version of P1 is not competing with the owner of P2; he is 
not the intended beneficiary of the FDA exemption.  
Based on this reasoning, at first glance, it may seem that research tools should be 
excluded completely from the FDA exemption.  However, creating a broad category of 
research tools that are excluded from the FDA exemption’s protection may inhibit 
research.  In fact, it is the vital role of research tools in the development of 
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pharmaceutical products that raises concerns about inhibiting the progress of research and 
development.  A complete exclusion of all uses of patented research tools from the FDA 
exemption raises a concern about a research tool owner withholding his research tool 
from a competing researcher; to block the development of a product that competes with a 
different patented invention owned by that same tool owner. 
E.  The potential for a patentee to use a research tool patent to defeat the 
FDA exemption’s objective of stimulating development of competing 
products. 
Once again, consider the above hypothetical--assume RVTR owns B1 and the 
patents on reagent z and the method of producing reagent z.  Without reagent z, our 
hypothetical researcher will be unable to catalyze his generic—G1’s reaction with 
cancerous cells. 8 By preventing our hypothetical researcher from accessing reagent z, 
RVTR can prevent him from carrying out experiments to develop G1 to a stage where it 
can obtain FDA approval.   Although the FDA exemption grants our researcher access to 
B1, his efforts cannot progress further, because of his inability to acquire reagent z.   
Consequently, our hypothetical researcher will not be able to experiment with G1, until 
RVTR’s patent on reagent z and the method of producing it expire.  
RVTR has blocked our hypothetical researcher’s access to reagent z and the risk 
of a patent infringement suit will deter him from manufacturing reagent z on its own and 
using it to perform tests to develop G1.  Using this technique, RVTR can effectively 
prevent our researcher from taking advantage of the FDA exemption and delay the sale of 
an FDA approved version of G1.   By creating an exception from the FDA exemption for 
all uses of “research tools” we have permitted RVTR to prevent our hypothetical 
 
8 This discussion is premised on the assumption that there are an insufficient number of alternatives to 
reagent z for catalyzing G1’s reaction with cancerous cells and that there are an insufficient number of 
known alternative methods for producing RVTR’s version of reagent z.  
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researcher from obtaining timely FDA approval of B1’s competitor, G1.  In essence, we 
have permitted RVTR to utilize a technique that reintroduces the regulatory delay that 
was removed by the enactment of the FDA exemption.  
When RVTR is blocking a researcher from developing a competing product, it is 
appropriate to allow the FDA exemption to protect our researcher’s use of reagent z for 
experiments related to FDA approval of G1.  Otherwise, the incentive to produce better 
research tools would be protected to the detriment of Congress’ desire to permit use of 
patented inventions for conducting pre-patent expiration experiments relating to FDA 
approval.  The FDA exemption was designed to offset the regulatory delay by enabling 
our hypothetical researcher to use B1 to provide G1 immediately, upon the expiration of 
the patent on B1.  RVTR should not be able to circumvent the FDA exemption’s 
objective by limiting access to reagent z in order to protect its market for B1.  Therefore, 
any exception that we create for excluding the use of a “research tool” must take into 
account RVTR’s ability to defeat the FDA exemption’s objective by blocking access to 
the research tool (reagent z).    
The remaining question is whether the FDA exemption can be interpreted to 
balance both the research tool patent holder’s concern and the need to provide timely 
post-expiration sale of competing versions of a patented invention subject to FDA 
approval?   Below is a proposed an analysis that provides a fairly good balance between 
the need to protect the incentive to develop pioneering research tools and the FDA 
exemption’s objective.  Although it is not a perfect solution, it provides some protection 
to both sides and is flexible enough to be modified on a case by case basis.   
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V.  A proposal for modifying the FDA exemption analysis to protect the incentive to 
produce research tools and timely development of competing FDA approved 
products.
The proposed analysis applies a combination of use, intent, a rebuttable 
presumption and the existing FDA exemption analysis.  The proposal is as follows: 1) 
after the FDA exemption is raised as a defense, the patentee gets an opportunity to assert 
that his invention is being used as a research tool; 2) next, the court applies the Use As a 
Research Tool (“UART”) factors to determine if a patentee’s invention is being used as a 
research tool; 3) based on the “UART” factors the court decides, if the patentee’s 
invention is being used as a research tool and whether or not it will raise a presumption 
against a researcher’s ability to assert the FDA exemption; 4) If the court finds that this 
presumption should apply, then a researcher can rebut it by establishing that the patentee 
is blocking the development of a competing product; and 5) finally, if the presumption is 
rebutted by a research or if the presumption does not apply, the court will need to apply 
the current FDA exemption analysis, as described under part III of this paper to the 
researcher’s activities.    
To decide whether or not a patentee’s invention is being used as a research tool, 
the court considers if it is the subject of a researcher’s experiments.  In fact, both the 
Supreme Court (in dictum) and Judge Newman, stated that distinguishing between the 
subject being tested and the object being used to study or aid in performing experiments 
with other material may be an appropriate method of identifying research tools.147 In 
essence, there is a difference between using an existing tool for research and study of the 
tool itself.148 This proposal takes this basic distinction and expands upon it to create a 
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working method for identifying when a patented invention is being used as a research 
tool.149 
Applying this distinction, we can create a rule that states when a patented 
invention itself is being studied or is the object being tested, it is not being used as a 
research tool.  On the other hand, when a patented invention is not being studied and is 
used to study or aid in performing experiments with other material, then it is being used 
as a research tool.  However, the court will need some method of filtering out the real 
cases where a patented invention is being used as a research tool from the false ones.   
A.  Protecting against false assertions that a patented invention is being used 
as a research tool or that a patented invention is the subject of 
experimentation.  
Courts should be mindful that creating a category for use of patented inventions 
called “research tools” and excluding it from the protection of the FDA exemption may 
create two undesirable incentives.  Patentees may sometimes be motivated to strengthen 
their infringement claims by falsely asserting that their patented inventions are being used 
as research tools, so that they can overcome an asserted FDA exemption defense.  A 
patentee that is able to successfully demonstrate that a researcher is using his patented 
invention as a “research tool” will get the benefit of the presumption that the FDA 
exemption does not apply.  With the benefit of the presumption that the FDA exemption 
does not apply, a patentee may be more likely to prevail on his infringement claim 
against a researcher.   
Conversely, researchers will be motivated to falsely assert that they are studying a 
patentee’s invention or that it is the subject of their tests to avoid the presumption that 
their activities fall outside the protection of the FDA exemption.  If a researcher 
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successfully asserts that he is studying a patentee’s invention or that it is the subject of his 
tests, then the court will not presume that his activities fall outside the boundaries of the 
FDA exemption.  By avoiding this presumption, a researcher can more easily assert the 
FDA exemption as a defense to a patentee’s infringement claim.  To protect against these 
undesirable assertions the proposal creates the UART factors to assist a court in filtering 
out these potentially false assertions by patentees and researchers.      
1.   Using the “UART” factors to determine if a patented invention is 
being used as a research tool.   
 
When considering whether or not a patented invention is being used as a research 
tool—the initial inquiry should be whether the patented invention is the subject of the 
testing or being used to perform research.  In making this determination, courts should 
perform a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a researcher’s use of a patentee’s 
invention to determine if it is used as a “research tool.”  In performing this analysis, the 
court should consider the following “UART” factors:  
1) the existence of recording data or test results on the patented invention;  
2) whether or not the patented invention is used to facilitate a step, process or 
other objectives in the experiment;  
 
3) the number of different tests performed on the patented invention claimed to be 
used to perform research versus the number of tests performed on other patented 
inventions;  
4) compare the percentage of tests performed on the patented invention claimed to 
be used as a research tool with the percentage of tests performed on other patented 
inventions that are the claimed to be the subject of the experiments;  
5) the timing of the tests on the patented invention claimed to be used as a 
research tool in relation to the researcher’s other activities;  
 
6) whether or not the type of testing that is performed on the patented invention 
conforms to applicable industry standards or regulations;  
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7)  how the industry predominately uses the patented invention claimed to be used 
as a research tool; 
8) does the patentee market his invention for studying or assisting in performing 
steps or processes in experiments with other materials;150 and 
9) the manner in which the results of the tests on the patented invention are used. 
Certainly, there is a distinction between a patented invention that is the subject of 
the tests and a patented invention that is used to study or aid in performing experiments 
with other materials.  However, in close cases, these “UART” factors can help the court 
in distinguishing between scenarios where a patented invention is the subject of the 
researcher’s experiments (being tested upon) and where a patented invention is used to 
study or aid in performing experiments with other materials (being used as a research 
tool).  The reader should note that this is merely an illustrative list and no single factor 
should be considered more important than another.  In fact, all of the “UART” factors do 
not have to be considered for every case; instead courts should decide which particular 
factors are relevant on a case by case basis.  To further demonstrate the finding a court 
must make and how it can use of these “UART” factors, we can go back to our 
hypothetical researcher’s use of reagent z, B1 and G1.   
2.  Applying the “UART” factors to our hypothetical researcher’s use 
of reagent z to determine if reagent z is being used as a research tool.  
 
In order to apply the “UART” factors, assume the following arguments and/or 
evidence are before the court: 1) the researcher claims to have performed 10 tests on 
reagent z, but only has recorded results for 5 tests; 2) the researcher has performed 20 
tests on B1 and G1 and has recorded results for 18 of the tests; 3) the researcher’s testing 
on B1 and G1 began on or about January 01, 1997; 4) the researcher’s testing on reagent 
z began on or about November 30, 2005; 5) the patentee for reagent z filed a complaint 
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alleging patent infringement against our researcher on or about February 15, 2006; 6) the 
researcher has used reagent z as a catalyst for G1’s reaction with cancerous cells in all 20 
of his tests on G1; 7) the patentee is asserting that reagent z is being used as a research 
tool to study G1 or aid in performing experiments to develop G1; and 8) the researcher is 
asserting that reagent z is the subject of his experiments or that he is studying reagent z.   
With this additional information about our hypothetical researcher’s use of reagent z, we 
are ready to apply the “UART” factors to decide if reagent z is being used as a research 
tool.   
In our hypothetical, because there are tests being performed on reagent z, B1, and 
G1, this may not be an easy case.   Reagent z could be the subject of the testing or just an 
aid in performing experiments with other material.  Therefore, the court should turn to the 
“UART” factors to see if they can assist in deciding whether or not our researcher is 
using reagent z as a research tool.  However, the court should elect to disregard factors 
that are inapplicable. 
 For example, there is no evidence of how the industry predominately uses reagent 
z or how the patentee markets reagent z, thus factors seven and eight cannot be 
effectively applied by the court.  Also, there is no evidence about industry standards, thus 
factor six cannot be effectively applied by the court.  In analyzing our hypothetical 
researcher’s use of reagent z, the court should disregard factors six, seven, eight and nine, 
because there is no evidence to properly apply them.  But there is sufficient evidence to 
properly apply factors one through five.  As such, we will apply only factors one through 
five to our hypothetical, but perform a general discussion of factors six through nine. 
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a) “UART” factor one: the existence of recording data or test results on 
the patented invention.
If a patented invention is the subject of the experiments, then there should be 
records for the results of the tests performed on such a patented invention.  A lack of 
records may help filter out a false assertion about a patented invention being the subject 
of the experiments.  On the other hand, if there are records of tests upon the patented 
invention claimed to be used as a “research tool”, then it is more likely to be the subject 
of a researcher’s experiments.  Although our hypothetical researcher claims to have 
performed ten tests on reagent z, he has only recorded results for five of the claimed tests.  
The lack of recorded results for the alleged tests on reagent z indicates that it is not the 
subject of this researcher’s experiments.   
In addition, our hypothetical researcher has testing results for eighteen of the 
twenty tests he has performed on B1 and G1.  The researcher’s meticulous recording of 
results on B1 and G1 indicates that they were really the subjects of his experiments.  
Because the researcher does not have results for each of the tests he claims to have 
performed on reagent z and he has records of results for almost all tests upon B1 and G1-
-factor one should weigh against a finding that reagent z is the subject of this researcher’s 
experiments.  Instead, this factor should favor the patentee’s assertion that reagent z is 
being used as a research tool.    
b) “UART” factor two: whether or not the patented invention is used to 
facilitate a step, process or other objectives in the experiment?
If the patentee’s invention does not facilitate a step or process in the experiments, 
then a researcher is more likely to be using it as a subject for his experiments.  If the 
patented invention helps facilitate a step or process in a researcher’s experiments, then a 
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researcher is more likely to be using it as a research tool.  Applying the second factor to 
our hypothetical, the court should note that reagent z has been used by the researcher in 
all twenty of his experiments with G1 to help catalyze G1’s reaction with cancer cells.  
Reagent z has been used by the researcher to help facilitate this process of his 
experiments with G1.  Consequently, the second “UART” factor should weigh in favor of 
finding that the researcher is using reagent z as a research tool.   
c) “UART” factor three: the number of different tests performed on the 
patented invention claimed to be used as a research tool versus the number 
of tests performed on other patented inventions. 
If the number of tests performed on the patented invention claimed to be used as 
a “research tool” is small in comparison to the number of tests performed on other 
materials or other patented inventions, then it is more likely that the patented invention at 
issue is being used as a research tool.  If the number of tests performed on the patented 
invention claimed to be a research tool is equal to, greater or marginally smaller than the 
number of tests performed on other material or other patented inventions; then it is more 
likely to be the subject of a researcher’s experiments.   
In our hypothetical case, the researcher claims to have performed ten experiments 
on reagent z, but has performed twenty experiments on B1 and G1.  Typically, a 
researcher will perform more experiments upon the subject of his experiments than 
something that is used as a research tool.  Therefore, the third “UART” factor favors a 
finding that reagent z is being used as a research tool.  Now, it may be that in some cases 
a factor is neutral--the factor may not weigh in favor of either finding.  For example, if 
our hypothetical researcher had performed eighteen experiments on reagent z, then this 
factor may be deemed neutral.  
All copyrights retained by Vihar R. Patel 42
d) “UART” factor four:  compare the percentage of tests performed on the 
patented invention claimed to be used as a research tool with the
percentage of tests performed on other patented inventions that are 
claimed to be the subject of the experiments.
With respect to factor four, the parties have not provided statistical information 
about the testing on reagent z, B1 and G1, thus the court may choose not to consider this 
factor.  However, since the actual numbers of experiments on reagent z (10), B1 (20) and 
G1 (20) are provided to the court, it may elect to calculate the percentages on its own or 
ignore them.  Let us assume the court elects to consider that the researcher has performed 
50 percent more tests upon B1 and G1, then this factor should weigh in favor of finding 
that reagent z is being used as a research tool.   
e) “UART” factor five: the timing of the tests on the patented invention 
claimed to be used as a research tool in relation to the researcher’s other 
activities.
If the timing of the tests on the patented invention claimed to be used as a 
research tool indicates that they were performed just before the patentee asserted his 
patent infringement claim, then it is probably an attempt to avoid the finding that the 
patentee’s invention is being used as a research tool.  If the timing of the tests on the 
patented invention occurred within the normal course of research and development, then 
a researcher is less likely to be making an effort to strengthen his FDA exemption 
defense.  Our hypothetical researcher began testing on reagent z, around November 30, 
2005, but initiated testing upon B1 and G1 in January of 1997.   
The researcher did not begin testing on reagent z, until about two and half months 
before the patentee filed a suit for infringement.  In this scenario, our hypothetical 
researcher’s testing upon reagent z is more likely an effort to strengthen his ability to 
assert the FDA exemption.  If reagent z was truly the subject of the testing, then the 
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researcher would not have waited so long to begin his experiments upon it.  Thus, this 
factor should weigh in favor of the finding that reagent z is being used as a research tool.  
If our hypothetical researcher had knowledge of the patentee’s impending claims for 
infringement and based on that knowledge initiated the testing on reagent z, then this 
factor would even more strongly favor the finding that reagent z is being used as a 
research tool.  
Now, before deciding what the court’s finding should be with respect to our 
hypothetical researcher’s use of reagent, we will briefly discuss “UART” factors six 
through nine for illustrative purposes.   
3. General discussion of how “UART” factors six through nine may be 
applied by courts.   
 
f) “UART” factor six: whether or not the type of testing that is performed 
on the patented invention conforms to applicable industry standards or 
regulations?
If a researcher’s tests upon the patented invention do not conform to industry 
standards, then it may be an improper effort to avoid a finding that he is really using the 
patented invention as a research tool.  Conversely, if a researcher’s tests upon the 
patented invention conform to industry standards, then it is likely that he is really not 
using it as a research tool.  This factor really goes to the legitimacy of the tests to 
determine if a patented invention is the subject of a researcher’s experimentation.  If the 
court is provided more detailed evidence about the researchers tests on reagent z and 
industry practices, it could use “UART” factor six to determine whether or not reagent z 
is being used as a research tool.     
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g) “UART” factor seven: how the industry predominately uses the 
patented invention claimed to be used as a research tool?
If the industry typically does not use the patented invention to aid or facilitate 
experiments, then it is less likely to be used as a research tool.  If the industry 
predominantly uses the patented invention to aid or facilitate steps in research, then it is 
more likely to be used as a research tool.  The court should consider evidence of the sales 
revenues and actual consumers for the patentee’s invention.  If more than fifty percent of 
the sales revenues are from use of the patented invention to aid or facilitate research, then 
it is likely to be used as a research tool.  If the majority of the consumers for the 
patentee’s invention are individuals or entities that perform research, then it is likely to be 
a research tool.   
However, if the consumers for the patentee’s invention are not researchers and 
less than fifty percent of the sales revenues are from use of the patented invention to 
facilitate steps in experiments, then the industry does not predominately use it as a 
research tool.  If the industry does not predominately use the patentee’s invention as a 
research tool, then it is less likely to be used as a research tool by a researcher.  With 
appropriate evidence, “UART” factor seven may be used by a court to decide if reagent z 
is being used as a research tool.        
h) “UART” factor eight: does the patentee market his invention for 
studying or assisting in performing steps or processes in experiments with 
other materials?
If a patentee markets his invention for use in studying or assisting in performing 
steps in experiments with other material, then it is more likely to be used as a research 
tool.  The court should consider the advertising and the market focus of the patentee to 
determine the intended consumers and recommended uses of the patented invention.  If a 
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patentee does not market his invention for use in studying or assisting in performing 
experiments with other materials, then it is less likely to be used as a research tool.  On 
the other hand, if a patentee markets his invention to researchers and recommends using 
it to assist in experimenting with other materials, then it is more likely to be a used as a 
research tool.  If the court had evidence of the advertising and market focus of reagent z’s 
owner, then “UART” factor eight may be useful to the court.  
i) “UART” factor nine: the manner in which the results of the tests on the 
patented invention are used.
If a researcher uses the results of the tests on the patented invention to compare or 
demonstrate equivalency with an alternative or competing product, then it is more likely 
to be the subject of a researcher’s experiments.  If a researcher submits the test results to 
the FDA, then it is more likely to be the subject of a researcher’s experiments.  
Conversely, if a researcher just stores the results of the tests on the patented invention, 
without using them for any other purpose, it is more likely to be a research tool in a 
researcher’s experiments.  Once again, evidence of how our hypothetical researcher used 
the results from the tests on reagent z would allow the court to utilize this UART factor.   
Although UART factors six through nine are not applicable to our hypothetical 
researcher’s use of reagent z, as illustrated above they may be useful to courts in deciding 
whether or not a patented invention is being used as a research tool.  In fact, if UART 
factors six through nine were applicable to our hypothetical they may dictate a different 
outcome.  With this general understanding of how to apply UART factors six through 
nine, let us briefly return to our hypothetical researcher to further understand the finding 
the proposed modification to the analysis for applying the FDA exemption requires.   
All copyrights retained by Vihar R. Patel 46
4.  Our hypothetical researcher is using reagent z as a research tool, 
thus the court should presume its activities are beyond the FDA 
exemption’s protective sphere.   
Returning to our hypothetical, although this is may have appeared to be a close 
case, applying “UART” factors one through five indicates that the court should find that 
our researcher is using reagent z as a research tool.  As you may recall, all five UART 
factors favored a finding that our hypothetical researcher was using reagent z as a 
research tool.  Based on the finding that our hypothetical researcher is using reagent z as 
a research tool, the court should invoke a presumption that his use of reagent z falls 
outside the protection of the FDA exemption.9 If we were to continue to use our 
hypothetical researcher, the next step is whether or not our researcher is able to rebut the 
presumption that his activities are outside the scope of the FDA exemption.   
However, the manner of performing the analysis for rebutting the presumption 
will be discussed without using our hypothetical researcher, because he is no longer 
crucial to understanding the modification.  Any researcher should be permitted to rebut 
this presumption by demonstrating that the owner of the research tool patent is limiting 
access to the research tool to delay a legitimate effort to bring a competing FDA 
approved product to the market.  An effort to block a researcher is likely when a single 
individual or entity owns both the patent on the research tool and the patented invention 
that is the subject of the researcher’s experiments.  The following part of the analysis 
considers objective evidence of the patentees’ intent.   
 
9 Alternatively, if the court believes that portions of reagent z may legitimately have been the subject of our 
hypothetical researcher’s tests, instead of an effort to avoid liability for patent infringement, then it could 
apply the presumption for those activities.  For example, the court could find that reagent z was the subject 
of the researcher’s study for the five experiments that he has recorded results.  For the remainder of the 
researcher’s use the court could find that the researcher is using reagent z as a research tool.  Consequently, 
the researcher would have to rebut the presumption that its activities are outside the scope of the FDA 
exemption for all of its use of reagent z, except for those five experiments.     
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B.  A researcher’s ability to rebut the presumption that his activities fall 
outside the scope of the FDA exemption by demonstrating that the research 
tool patent owner is blocking his efforts to develop a competing product.  
The research tool patent (RTP) owner’s intent is reviewed to determine if it is 
withholding access to a research tool to prevent a researcher from being able to undertake 
development of a competing or derivative version of a different patented invention.  A 
key inquiry will be ownership of the “research tool” patent and the “branded patented 
invention.”10 Generally, a researcher will be trying to create a competing or derivative 
version of the branded invention that meets with FDA approval.   
The court should simply, determine if there is a commonality of an interest to 
exclude by evaluating the ownership of the RTP and the branded patented invention 
(BPI).  If the owner of the RTP is different from the owner of the BPI, then there is 
minimal concern of a successful effort to block a researcher’s attempts to obtain FDA 
approval of a competing, alternative or derivative product.  Therefore, a court should 
consider a commonality of an interest to exclude to determine if the RTP owner is 
engaging in an effort to prevent a researcher from bringing a competing product to the 
market.    
 In the ownership analysis, the court should consider the following: 1) a parent 
company relationship between the owner of the BPI and RTP; 2) a subsidiary relationship 
between the owner of the BPI and RTP; 3) a holding company relationship between the 
owners of the BPI and RTP; and 4) exclusive licensee relationships between the owners 
of the BPI and RTP.  The purpose is to determine whether or not the owners of the BPI 
and RTP have a common interest in excluding others from being able to use their 
 
10 I am using the terms of “branded patented invention” to refer to the object of the study. Generally, this is 
a successful patented product and others are seeking to duplicate that success by creating an alternative, 
competing or derivative version of this product.    
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technologies.  If a researcher demonstrates a parent, subsidiary, holding company or 
exclusive licensee relationship between the RTP and BPI owners, then the court should 
find that a commonality of an interest to exclude has been demonstrated.   
1.  Finding a commonality of an interest to exclude a researcher from 
the market for the BPI should lead the court to consider evidence of 
collusion or overreaching.   
 
If a researcher is able to demonstrate that there is a commonality of an interest to 
exclude, then the court may consider evidence of actual collusion or overreaching during 
licensing negotiations.  Within the context of the collusive or overreaching efforts 
arguments, the court should consider the availability of alternative tools or patented 
inventions that a researcher may substitute for the BPI and RTP owners’ invention.  Such 
evidence is considered in determining if the BPI and RTP owner(s) is or are engaging in 
an effort to prevent the researcher from bringing a competing product to the market.  
Courts should be mindful that permitting a collusive efforts argument in every case may 
defeat the presumption’s ability to protect research tool owners.  Thus, the collusive 
efforts argument should not be permitted in every case.  If a researcher does not 
demonstrate a commonality of an interest to exclude, then the collusive or overreaching 
efforts argument should not be permitted.   
After considering evidence of collusion or overreaching, if a court finds that a 
researcher is unable to demonstrate that the RTP owner is using his patent to block efforts 
to develop a competing or derivative version of a BPI, then the presumption remains and 
the researcher’s effort to assert the FDA exemption as an affirmative defense should 
fail.151 On the other hand, if a researcher demonstrates that a RTP owner using his RTP 
to block efforts to develop a competing, alternative or derivative version of a BPI 
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effectively, then he has rebutted the presumption.  If a researcher successfully rebuts the 
presumption, then the court should proceed to apply the existing version of the FDA 
exemption analysis summarized under part III of this paper.  Alternatively, if the court 
had found that reagent z was the subject of a researcher’s experiments instead of a 
research tool, then it should skip the presumption portion of the proposed modified 
analysis and move directly to the current version of the FDA exemption analysis 
summarized under part III of this paper.    
C.  If the court finds that the patented invention is the subject of the 
researcher’s experiments, then the traditional FDA exemption analysis 
should apply. 
If a researcher is performing tests upon the patented invention or it is the subject 
of the experiments performed to obtain FDA approval of a competing or derivative 
product, then it is not being used as a research tool.  As discussed above, this type of 
activity is exactly what the FDA exemption was designed to promote--activities that lead 
to the FDA’s approval of competing or derivative versions of patented inventions for 
immediate post-patent expiration sales.  In this context, the research tool patent holder’s 
concern is outweighed by the FDA exemption’s objective.  Even if a patented invention 
is something that could be used as a research tool, when it is the subject of the 
experiments, it is not being used as a research tool.   
Under these circumstances, because such a researcher is using the patented 
invention as the subject of his experiment to develop a product that competes with the 
RTP owner’s product, he is the intended beneficiary of the FDA exemption.  
Consequently, there is no need to presume that such a researcher’s activities are outside 
the scope of the FDA exemption.  The RTP owner’s interest is outweighed by the FDA 
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exemption’s desire to avoid an unwarranted extension of his patent term by delaying the 
development of a competing research tool product. 
If a researcher has to wait, until the patent on the research tool expires to begin 
the process of obtaining FDA approval of a competing version of the research tool, then 
the RTP owner will get a practical extension of his right to exclude due to the regulatory 
delay.  In this context, a RTP owner is no different from any other owner of a patented 
invention that must go through the FDA’s approval process to practice his claimed 
invention.  When a patented invention is the subject of the researcher’s experiments, 
whether it is normally a research tool or not, the court should proceed to apply the current 
version of the FDA exemption analysis as described in part III of this paper.     
D.  Allocating burdens of proof and production in the proposed modification 
for applying the FDA exemption to meet the concerns of the research tool 
holders and the pharmaceutical industry.  
Since the FDA exemption is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof to 
establish that his activities are reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval should 
always be upon the researcher.152 The burden of proof with respect to whether or not 
something is being used as a research tool should be on the patentee attempting to assert 
that his patented invention is being used as a research tool.  The burden of proof for 
rebutting the presumption that the FDA exemption does not apply to his activities will be 
upon the researcher.  The burden of producing evidence will also vary at different stages 
of the proposed modification of the FDA exemption analysis.   
The burden of producing evidence of how the patented invention is used will be 
upon the researcher, because he has this type of evidence.  The burden of producing 
evidence about the ownership should be upon the owners of the BPI and RTP, because 
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they have access to this type of information.  The burden of producing evidence 
demonstrating that a researcher’s use of patented invention is reasonably related to 
obtaining FDA approval will be upon the researcher.  Allocating the burdens of proof and 
production, as described above will further help to ensure that the court has accurate 
information to use in balancing the RTP owner’s interest with the FDA exemption’s 
objective.   
E.  The flexibility and nuance provided by the proposed modification to the 
FDA exemption analysis make it a better solution than a bright line test for 
the pharmaceutical industry.  
In this uncertain legal arena, the flexibility of the proposed test provides the 
additional advantage of adapting to the needs of the research tool owner, the researcher, 
and the court.  Despite the illusory attractiveness of precise rules, nuanced and flexible 
standards are generally more appropriate for the dynamic innovation environment 
confronted by the Federal Circuit.153 Although the modified analysis will exclude the use 
of a “patented invention” as a “research tool” from the FDA exemption, it will also give 
the industry the option of creating a competing research tool to alleviate against 
impediments to research and development of new or competing products.  Further, 
owners of research tool patents are still encouraged to invent and disclose their invention, 
because they will be able to enforce their right to exclude use of their “patented 
invention” as a “research tool.”   
The proposed modification is not a bright line test; instead it is nuanced and better 
suited to the needs of the pharmaceutical industry.  Bright-line legal tests help provide 
certainty and predictability, but in the pharmaceutical industry’s rapidly changing area of 
technological research, a bright line rule is likely to result in unfairness, over and under 
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inclusiveness. 154 A static definition of research tools will be unable to adapt to the 
changing needs of the pharmaceutical industry.  Something that is a research tool today 
may not be used as a research tool tomorrow.  There may be patented inventions that can 
be used as research tools in some situations, but not in others; these inventions may fall 
on the wrong side of the research tool definition.   
In addition to the over and under inclusiveness concerns, a bright line may not 
serve the goals of the FDA exemption.  Employing a static definition of research tools 
and excluding them completely from the scope of the FDA exemption, may grant a RTP 
owner a means to block a researcher’s effort to develop competing or derivative versions 
of the BPI.  A complete exclusion of all uses of a patented invention based on a pre-
defined category of “research tools” may defeat the FDA exemption’s objective of 
permitting pre-expiration approval activities of research tools that require FDA approval.   
At this time, due to the lack of empirical studies supporting either side of the 
issue, a judicially or legislatively carved out exception for all uses of research tools is too 
drastic a remedy.  In fact, the Solicitor General’s amicus brief in the Merck II decision 
indicates that excluding the pre-clinical phase from the FDA exemption had an 
immediate adverse impact on the research and development of new drugs.155 
Consequently, taking the drastic step of creating a pre-defined category of “research 
tools” and excluding all uses of this category of “research tools” may result in a similar 
decrease in research and development.     
1.  An empirical analysis may be unrealistic, because of the difficulty 
in obtaining accurate and complete data.  Therefore, the modified 
proposal’s flexible and nuanced approach is more appropriate than 
decisive legislative action. 
 
In order to perform an empirical analysis we would need the following type of 
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information: 1) how researchers are using different patented inventions; 2) how often 
they are using a patented invention to study or aid in performing experiments; 3) what 
types of patented inventions researchers generally use as a research tool; 4) whether or 
not a patented invention that is used as a research tool has a narrow range of alternative 
uses; 5) to what extent will a market for a patentee’s invention be decreased by 
permitting researchers to use his invention as a research tool; and 6) whether or not a 
patentee’s ability to recoup the costs of research and development will be nullified, 
because of a loss in revenues from sale or licensing of a patented invention that is used as 
a research tool.  As argued below, the general interests of researchers’ and patentees’ do 
not favor providing the aforementioned type of information to perform an empirical 
analysis.    
Many researchers will be unwilling to disclose their use of research tools or 
techniques, unless their uses are already protected from claims of patent infringement.   
By disclosing their uses of research tools and techniques, disclosing researchers may 
open themselves to infringement claims.  Without first being assured that they will be 
able to raise the FDA exemption defense for their use of a patented invention as a 
research tool, many researchers will be reluctant to provide complete and accurate 
accounts of their potentially infringing use.  Conversely, if use of research tools is already 
protected from infringement claims by the FDA exemption, then RTP owners will be 
concerned about limiting the perceived value of their claimed inventions.   
A RTP owner that asserts that his patented invention should be treated as a 
research tool, because it has a very limited range of uses; may incur a perceived decrease 
in the value of his invention.  This particular concern of RTP owners is heightened by the 
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potential for a perceived decrease in value of their claimed inventions in the eyes of 
company shareholders.156 Company shareholders will be concerned about any 
admissions from a RTP owner about a potential loss of markets, revenues or inability to 
recoup research and development costs.  Thus, trying to get accurate and complete 
information from RTP owners about what may be a research tool is not only difficult, but 
may be unrealistic.   
Finally, the difficult in performing an empirical analysis disfavors new legislative 
action.  As discussed above, the modification to the current FDA exemption analysis does 
not require any new legislative action.  This creates an added benefit, because the 
proposed modification will not incur legislative delays or additional interpretation issues 
created by new regulations or statutes.  Creating a legislative proposal without having 
empirical studies on both sides of the issue may be akin to using a bulldozer to knock 
down a single tree.  The proposed modification interprets the FDA exemption to allow a 
researcher to make products that compete with a patented invention by using the same 
patented invention to obtain FDA approval.  This interpretation is consistent with prior 
court decisions.  Further, the proposal merely creates a rebuttal presumption as a 
procedural effort by courts for balancing the varying interests of RTP owners and 
researchers.  In this uncertain arena, the flexibility and nuance provided by the modified 
proposal and the associated ability to make a case by case determination about whether or 
not the FDA exemption should apply to the use of a patented invention as a research tool 
seems to be a better approach. 
VI.  Conclusion. 
 In summary, the proposed modification is as follows:  
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1) First, a patentee will assert claims of infringement against a researcher;  
2) Next, a researcher will assert the FDA exemption as a defense to the claims of 
infringement;  
3)  At this stage, the modified proposal would permit a patentee to assert that a 
researcher is using his patented invention as a research tool; 
4) The court would then decide, if a researcher is using the patented invention as a 
research tool (the court may elect to use the applicable UART factors to aid its decision); 
5(a) If the court finds that a researcher is using the patentee’s invention as a 
research tool, then it will presume that this researcher’s activities are outside the 
protection of the FDA exemption;  
5(b) If the court finds that a researcher is not using the patentee’s invention as a 
research tool, then it will bypass the presumption and skip to step eight; 
6) A researcher may rebut the presumption that his activities are outside the 
protection of the FDA exemption by demonstrating: (a) a commonality of an interest to 
exclude between the patentee asserting infringement and the owner of the branded 
patented invention and (b) collusion or overreaching in the form of an effort to block the 
researcher from developing a product that competes with the branded patented invention;  
7) If the researcher rebuts this presumption, then the court proceeds to step 8; if 
the researcher does not rebut the presumption, then he cannot raise the FDA exemption as 
a defense to a patentee’s claim of infringement; and 
8)  The court applies the current or existing version of the FDA exemption to 
determine if a researcher’s activities are reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval. 
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(See—Part III of this paper for a detailed summary of the current FDA exemption 
analysis).   
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